Global Compact International Yearbook 2013
26
UNGC commitment seriously arguably has an obligation to
promote public policies to this effect, particularly where it is
present in or entering a country with weak institutions and
rule of law. It is also in companies’ interests to do so. Consider
the following caricature, based on Principle 4 (eliminating
all forms of forced and compulsory labor): If you are going
beyond local regulations and paying your own staff decently,
but your competitor is using slave labor, then you are at a
disadvantage, mutatis mutandis. If you accept the “fallacy of
restricted alternatives” and race for the well-publicized bot-
tom by employing your own slave labor, then your company
will suffer reputational damage when (not if) your behavior
is reported in your home market. Instead, you can promote
stricter standards and monitoring – policies that create a
level playing field at an acceptable level. If raising your rivals’
costs gives you a competitive advantage in the process, then
so much the better.
If it is this simple, then why does it not happen all the time?
Indeed, why does lobbying have such a bad reputation at all?
And why are we not seeing improvements over time, in line
with CSR developments in other areas?
There is emerging evidence that the problem is at least partly
one of perception. In her recent study of corporate environ-
mental lobbying in Europe, Sigrun Wagner found that while
companies see environmental protection as important, specific
regulations present costs and/or opportunities: The emphasis
has been on regulations’ cost-effectiveness. Where companies
see environmental regulations only in terms of costs (which is
often), they tend to lobby defensively, that is, to block policy
proposals. In a similar study, Stephanos Anastasiadis found
that the way companies understand the nature of the political
process – and their role within it – is critical for the nature
of their engagement. Most companies took an instrumental
approach to lobbying – analogous to seeing policies only in
cost terms. A minority took a cooperative approach. These
are very different perspectives. For example, companies
taking an instrumental approach tend to understand their
own engagement in terms of acting to prevent government
interference, which they see as unnecessary and intrusive. The
more cooperative companies, by contrast, tend to value the
legislative process as generating freedom to innovate within
limits that apply to all. Both studies point to a sense that the
“
simple facts” are less important for responsible lobbying than
the manner in which companies make sense of what is going
on. This suggests that problems in lobbying will continue
until companies address the underlying phenomenon. This
really matters, because in a world of social media, ubiquitous
internet access, and whistle-blowers, companies have more
to lose than ever. In 2005, the UNGC noted a significant gap
between “everyday CSR” policies and activities on the one hand,